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1. Introduction
This paper takes a new look at the long-run dynamics of in‡ation and unemploy-
ment in response to permanent changes in the growth rate of the money supply.
We examine the Phillips curve from the perspective of what we call “frictional
growth,” i.e. the interaction between money growth and nominal frictions. Af-
ter presenting theoretical models of this phenomenon, we construct an empirical
model of the Spanish economy that aims to capture the essential features of the
interplay between money growth and prolonged nominal adjustment processes. In
this context, we evaluate the long-run in‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤ for Spain
and examine how recent policy changes have a¤ected it.
The mainstream analysis of in‡ation and unemployment rests on the standard
assumption that economic agents make their demand and supply decisions on the
basis of real variables alone and thus, in the long-run labor market equilibrium, a
change in the money supply has no real e¤ects; it simply changes all nominal vari-
ables in proportion. It was on the basis of such money neutrality that Friedman
(1968) and Phelps (1968) formulated the natural rate (or NAIRU) hypothesis, in
which there is no permanent tradeo¤ between in‡ation and unemployment.
We show that in the presence of money growth and time-contingent nominal
contracts, this argument does not necessarily hold. Under plausible circumstances
speci…ed below, changes in money growth may a¤ect the unemployment rate
and other real variables in the long run. This result enables our analysis to
avoid a well-documented - but frequently ignored - counterfactual prediction of
the NAIRU theory: Supposing that the NAIRU is reasonably stable through
time - a commonly made assumption - in‡ation falls (rises) without limit when
unemployment is high (low).
Another problem with the NAIRU theory is that, when combined with the
rational expectations hypothesis, it implies that an inverse relation between in-
‡ation and unemployment manifests itself primarily in response to unanticipated
demand shocks. However, over the 1980s and 1990s many OECD countries had
reasonably stable demand conditions (with a few notable exceptions), and never-
theless they frequently experienced large ‡uctuations in unemployment along-side
relatively small changes in in‡ation for periods as long as …ve or ten years, or even
longer. This evidence is di¢cult to reconcile with a stable NAIRU.1 Large and
prolonged demand-side shocks were, in many countries, followed by prolonged
changes in unemployment accompanied by only very slow declines in in‡ation.
Even longer-term in‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤s were found by Phillips (1958),
1One may, of course, drop the assumption of a stable NAIRU and use the data to infer
NAIRU movements, in accordance with the NAIRU theory. In that case, however, the NAIRU
theory loses much of its predictive power.
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Lipsey (1960) and others over the century preceding the late 1960s. Macroeco-
nomic policy authorities often make monetary and …scal policy decisions with
prolonged in‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤s in mind.
This paper presents a model of the Phillips curve that avoids the counterfactual
prediction that in‡ation falls (rises) without limit when unemployment is low
(high), and it allows for the possibility of a long-run tradeo¤ between in‡ation
and unemployment.
Our analysis rests on three empirical regularities: (i) the growth rate of the
money supply is nonzero, (ii) there is some nominal inertia, so that a current
nominal variable is slow to adjust to money growth shocks, and (iii) unemployment
is in‡uenced by the ratio of the nominal money supply to that nominal variable
(such as the ratio of the money supply to the price level).
The …rst regularity provides a reasonable time-series description of the money
supply in most OECD countries. The second stylized fact is well-established
empirically and has been rationalized theoretically.2 In the presence of staggered
time-contingent nominal contracts, current wages are a weighted average of their
past and expected future values. A well-known result in the literature on the
microfoundations of wage-price staggering3 is that when the rate of time discount
is positive, the past is weighted more heavily than the future. It is in this sense
that current prices and wages may be taken to be characterized by nominal inertia.
The third regularity can take a variety of conventional forms, e.g. a change in
the ratio of the money supply to the price level may a¤ect aggregate demand and
thereby the unemployment rate.
In Section 2, we present three “toy models” of the macroeconomy, designed to
highlight simply how frictional growth can lead to a long-run in‡ation unemploy-
ment tradeo¤. The equations of these models are ad hoc, short-hand summaries
of plausible macro relations. In Section 3, we present a Phillips curve model with
proper microfoundations. Section 4 contains an empirical model of the Spanish
in‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤; we …nd that this tradeo¤ is far from vertical in
the long run. Section 5 evaluates how this tradeo¤ has been a¤ected by major
shifts in economic policy. Finally, Section 6 concludes. Our analysis suggests that
a signi…cant portion of the surge in the Spanish unemployment rate in the 1990s
is due to contractionary monetary policy.
2See, for example, Taylor (1979)) on wage staggering, Calvo (1983), or Lindbeck and Snower
(1999) on price precommitment with production lags. The literature on the e¤ectiveness mone-
tary policy under wage-price staggering has been surveyed by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999),
Goodfriend and King (1997), Mankiw (2001), and others.
3For example, Ascari (2000), Ascari and Rankin (2002), Graham and Snower (2002), and
Helpman and Leiderman (1990).
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2. Toy Models
This section presents transparently simple macro models to describe two channels
whereby permanent changes in money growth may have permanent e¤ects on
both in‡ation and unemployment. We call these “toy models” since they are easy
to play around with, being merely heuristic devices for introducing our ideas.
They are speci…ed in an ad hoc way, as stripped-down pictures of how a long-run
in‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤ may arise.
The …rst model describes the “real money balance channel,” i.e. an increase in
money growth a¤ects long-run real money balances and thereby the long-run un-
employment rate. The second model considers the “real wage channel,” whereby
an increase in money growth a¤ects long-run unemployment via the real wage and
employment. And the third model considers both channels operating in tandem.
2.1. Model 1: The Real Money Balance Channel
In this model and the ones that follow, all variables - except the unemployment
rate - are in logs. All uninteresting constants are ignored. Since we wish to focus
on the long-run in‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤ and since movements along this
tradeo¤ arise from permanent changes in money growth, let money growth have
a unit root:
¢Mt ´ ¹t = ¹t¡1 + "t; (2.1)
where Mt is the (log of the) money supply and "t is a white-noise error term.
The current price level depends on the past price level and the money supply:
Pt = aPt¡1 + (1¡ a)Mt; (2.2)
where the “price sluggishness parameter” a is a constant, 0 < a < 1. This is
the only substantive ad hoc simpli…cation that this model makes in describing
frictional growth. As noted, the microfoundations literature on price staggering
indicates that the current price level is a weighted average of past and expected
future price levels, with the past weighted more heavily than the future, under time
discounting. Equation (2.2) provides a simpli…ed picture of this source of price
inertia and it thereby clari…es the mechanism whereby frictional growth generates
a downward-sloping long-run Phillips curve. (We will consider a microfounded
model in Section 3.)
Aggregate product demand depends on real money balances:
QDt = (Mt ¡ Pt) : (2.3)
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The aggregate production function is
QSt = ¾Nt; (2.4)
where ¾ is a positive constant4. The labor supply is constant:
Lt = L; (2.5)
so that the unemployment rate (not in logs) can be approximated as
ut = L¡Nt: (2.6)
Observe that money illusion is absent in system (2.1)-(2.6): if all nominal vari-
ables are changed in equal proportion, then the associated real variables remain
unchanged. Nevertheless, it can be shown that there is a long-run in‡ation-
unemployment tradeo¤ and that changes in money growth can move the economy
along this tradeo¤.
De…ning the in‡ation rate as ¼t ´ Pt ¡ Pt¡1 and taking the …rst di¤erence of
the price equation (2.2), we obtain
¼t = a¼t¡1 + (1¡ a)¹t: (2.7)
It is straightforward to show that, in this context, the long-run in‡ation rate
is equal to the long-run money growth rate: ¼LRt = ¹LRt (which bears the time
subscript since money growth is a random walk).5 Furthermore, long-run real
money balances depend on long-run money growth rate:6
(Mt ¡ Pt)
LR =
a
1¡ a
¹LRt : (2.8)
4¾ = 1 under constant returns to labor, and ¾ is less (greater) than unity under diminishing
(increasing) returns.
5To see this, rewrite equation (2.7) as ¼t = ¹t ¡
a
1¡a¢¼t: Thus, given structural stability,
the long-run relationship between the in‡ation rate and the growth rate of money supply is
¼LRt = ¹
LR
t ¡
a
1 ¡ a
(¢¼t)
LR : (F1)
Now take the …rst di¤erence of (2.7), ¢¼t = a¢¼t¡1 + (1 ¡ a)¢¹t, and note that the long-run
solution this equation is given by its unconditional expectation: (¢¼t)
LR ´ E (¢¼t). Taking
expectations on both sides of the previous equation, we obtain
E (¢¼t) = 0; or (¢¼t)
LR = 0; (F2)
since E (¢¼t) = E (¢¼t¡1) ; due to stationarity, and E (¢¹t) = 0; by equation (2.1), where E
is the unconditional expectations operator.
Substitution of (F2) into (F1) yields ¼LRt = ¹LRt :
6To see this, note that equation (2.2) may be rewritten as (1 ¡ a)Mt = (1 ¡ a)Pt +a¼t, and
recall that ¼LRt = ¹LRt .
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Consequently, by (2.3)-(2.6) and (2.8), we obtain a long-run (steady-state)
relation between unemployment and in‡ation:
¼LRt = ¾
µ
1¡ a
a
¶¡
L¡ uLRt
¢
(2.9)
The long-run Phillips curve is ‡atter,
² the greater is the price sluggishness parameter a and
² the greater is the curvature of the production function (i.e. the smaller ¾).
It is straightforward to see the intuition underlying the downward slope of
the Phillips curve. When the money supply grows, the price level chases after
a moving target. But since the money supply keeps on increasing, the price
adjustments never work themselves out entirely. By the time the current price
level has begun to respond to the current increase in the money supply, the money
supply increases again, prompting a new round of price adjustments. The greater
is money growth, the greater will be the di¤erence between the target and actual
price levels (ceteris paribus). Thus a permanent increase in money growth not
only increases long-run in‡ation, but also raises real money balances and thereby
reduces unemployment in the long run. On this account, there is a long-run
tradeo¤ between in‡ation and unemployment.
2.2. Model 2: The Real Wage Channel
Our second macro model deals with the real wage channel. To illustrate this
channel as simply as possible, suppose that the price level adjusts instantaneously
to the money supply:
Pt =Mt; (2.10)
whereas the nominal wage is sluggish, depending on its past value and the current
money supply:
Wt = bWt¡1 + (1¡ b)Mt; (2.11)
where b, the “wage sluggishness parameter,” is a constant, 0 < b < 1.
As in the previous section, the growth rate of money supply has a unit root, as
given by equation (2.1). In this context, an unexpected change in money growth
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leads to a change in the real wage. Employment, in turn, depends on the real
wage:
Nt = c0 ¡ c1 (Wt ¡ Pt) ; (2.12)
where Wt ¡ Pt is the log of the real wage; and the labor demand curve is de-
rived from the production function (2.4), so that c0 = log ¾1¡¾ and c1 =
¾
¾¡1 : As
in the previous section, the labor supply is constant (equation (2.5)), and the
unemployment rate is given by equation (2.6).
De…ning the rate of wage in‡ation as ºt = Wt ¡Wt¡1, and taking the …rst
di¤erence of the wage equation (2.11), we obtain
º t = bºt¡1 + (1¡ b)¹t; (2.13)
Thus the long-run rate of wage in‡ation is ºLRt = ¼LRt . The long-run real wage
depends on the long-run money growth rate:7
(Wt ¡ Pt)LR =
¡b
1¡ b
¹LRt : (2.14)
The greater the long-run growth rate of the money supply, the lower is the cor-
responding long-run real wage. Thus greater is employment and the lower is
unemployment in the long run.
To derive the associated long-run Phillips curve, observe that ¹t = ¼t (by
equation (2.10), recall that ºLRt = ¼LRt , and use equations (2.12), (2.6) and (2.14)
to obtain:
¼LRt =
1¡ b
c1b
¡
L¡ uLRt
¢
(2.15)
This long-run Phillips curve is ‡atter,
² the greater is the wage sluggishness parameter b and
² the greater is the slope of the labor demand curve c1.
Once again, the intuition is clear. When the nominal wage is subject to more
inertia than the price level then, in the presence of money growth, the wage chases
after its moving wage target more slowly than the price chases after its moving
price target. The faster the money supply grows, the more the price level rises
relative to the nominal wage. Thus the real wage falls, labor demand rises, and
unemployment falls.
7To see this, rewrite the wage equation as (1 ¡ b)Pt = (1 ¡ b)Wt + bºt.
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An obvious de…ciency of the real wage channel is that, on its own, it implies
that real wages always move counter-cyclically, and this prediction is counterfac-
tual. The evidence suggests that although real wages are counter-cyclical in some
countries during some time periods, there are plenty of occasions in which they are
pro-cyclical and acyclical. In practice, however, the real wage channel is unlikely
to operate in isolation. When it is combined with the real money balance channel,
for instance, the resulting real wages are no longer necessarily counter-cyclical, as
shown below.8 Furthermore, it is well to keep in mind that, in practice, the real
wage moves in response to many determinants, of which the money supply is
only one. Thus an inverse relation between the real wage and money growth may
coexist with pro-cyclical real wage behavior.
2.3. Model 3: Both Channels
Our …nal macro model is concerned with the interplay between the two channels
above, which turns out to have interesting implications for the long-run in‡ation-
unemployment tradeo¤. For this purpose, we consider a model in which there is
lagged adjustment in both wages and prices. Speci…cally, let the money growth
rate be given by equation (2.1), the price equation by (2.2), the wage equation by
(2.11), labor supply by (2.5), and unemployment by (2.6):
¢Mt ´ ¹t = ¹t¡1 + "t;
Wt = bWt¡1 + (1¡ b)Mt;
Pt = aPt¡1 + (1¡ a)Mt;
Lt = L;
ut = L¡Nt;
where the price- and wage-sluggishness parameters satisfy 0 < a; b < 1:
Furthermore, to enable both channels to operate, we extend the labor demand
equation to allow employment to depend on both the real wage (wt ´ Wt ¡ Pt)
and real money balances (Mt ¡ Pt)9:
Nt = c0 ¡ c1wt +
1
¾
(Mt ¡ Pt) ; (2.16)
where the parameters c0; c1 and ¾ are positive.
8The reason is that the impulse-response function of the real wage to money growth shocks
need not be monotonic.
9The underlying assumption now is that changes in product demand (initiated by changes
in real money balances) can in‡uence the position of the labor demand function. Lindbeck and
Snower (1994), for example, describe various microfounded channels whereby product demand
changes can a¤ect the labor demand function in the long run.
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To derive the in‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤ in this setting, we …rst obtain
the stochastic process for the real wage by subtracting the price equation (2.2)
from the wage equation (2.11):
wt = (a+ b)wt¡1 ¡ abwt¡2 ¡ (b¡ a) ¹t; (2.17)
Next, note that the price equation (2.2) can be rewritten in terms of the real
money balances:10
(Mt ¡ Pt) = a (Mt¡1 ¡ Pt¡1) + a¹t: (2.18)
Substitute equation (2.17) and (2.18) into the labor demand equation (2.16)
to …nd how employment depends on its past values and money growth:
Nt = (a+ b)Nt¡1 ¡ abNt¡2 +
h
c1 (b¡ a) +
a
¾
(1¡ b)
i
¹t +
ab
¾
"t: (2.19)
Finally, by manipulation of equations (2.6) and (2.19) gives the following
stochastic process for the unemployment rate:
ut = (a+ b) ut¡1 ¡ abut¡2 + (1¡ a) (1¡ b)L¡
h
c1 (b¡ a) +
a
¾
(1¡ b)
i
¹t ¡
ab
¾
"t;
(2.20)
Thus the long-run unemployment rate is
uLRt = L¡

¾c1 (b¡ a) + a (1¡ b)
¾ (1¡ a) (1¡ b)
¸
¹LRt ; (2.21)
and the associated long-run Phillips curve is11
¼LRt =
¾ (1¡ a) (1¡ b)
¾c1 (b¡ a) + a (1¡ b)
¡
L¡ uLRt
¢
: (2.22)
It can be shown that
10By equation (2.2),
Pt = aPt¡1 + (1 ¡ a)Mt ) (Mt ¡ Pt) = aMt ¡ aPt¡1
(Mt ¡ Pt) = aMt ¡ aPt¡1 + aMt¡1 ¡ aMt¡1 = a (Mt¡1 ¡ Pt¡1) + a¹t:
11Note that, in the context of this model, b > a (more wage sluggishness than price slug-
gishness) is a su¢cient condition for the Phillips curve to be downward-sloping. In this case,
the money balance and real wage channels reinforce one another: an increase in money growth
not only raises real money balances, but it also reduces the real wage (since the nominal wage
responds less than the price level). But if b < a, the Phillips curve is still downward-sloping
provided that ¾c1 <
a(1¡b)
(a¡b) .
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² The greater the wage sluggishness parameter b, the ‡atter is the long-run
Phillips curve.12 The more sluggish is the nominal wage, the more will
a given change in money growth reduce the real wage and thereby raise
employment (ceteris paribus). Thus the greater will be the reduction in
unemployment relative to the rise in in‡ation.
² The greater is the price sluggishness parameter a, the ‡atter is the long-run
Phillips curve, provided that the real money balance channel dominates the
real wage channel, i.e. when 1=¾ > c1 in the employment equation (2.16).13
The more sluggish is the price level, the more will a given change in money
growth raise real money balances as well as the real wage (ceteris paribus).
Then, if the money balance channel dominates the real wage channel, the
greater will be the rise in employment, and therefore the greater the fall in
unemployment relative to the increase in in‡ation14.
² If the money balance channel dominates the real wage channel, then the wage
sluggishness and price sluggishness are complementary in their in‡uence in
making the long-run Phillips curve ‡atter. In particular,15
@2»
@b@a
=
2¾2c1 (1¡ a) (1¡ b) (1¡ ¾c1)
[¾c1 (b¡ a) + a (1¡ b)]
3 > 0 if ¾c1 < 1:
3. A Microfounded Model
Whereas the macro models above convey our intuitions as simply as possible,
this section develops a model of the real wage channel that can be given …rm
microfoundations.16 We consider a labor market containing a …xed number of
identical …rms with monopoly power in the product market. The i’th …rm has a
production function of the form
qSi;t = An
¾
i;t; (3.1)
12To see this, let the slope (in absolute value) of the long-run Phillips curve be denoted by
» = @¼
LR
t
@uLRt
= ¾(1¡a)(1¡b)¾c1(b¡a)+a(1¡b) . Then observe that
@»
@b = ¡
¾2c1(1¡a)2
(¾c1(b¡a)+a(1¡b))2
< 0.
13Observe that @»@a =
¡¾(1¡¾c1)(1¡b)2
[c1(b¡a)+ae(1¡b)]2
< 0 if ¾c1 < 1:
14Conversely, if ¾c1 > 1; increased price sluggishness makes the Phillips curve steeper: @»@a > 0:
15On the other hand, if the real wage channel dominates, then wage sluggishness and price
sluggishness are substitutes ( @
2»
@b@a < 0, ¾c1 > 1).
16For microfoundations of the real money balance channel, see Karanassou, Sala, and Snower
(2002).
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where qSi;t is output supplied, ni;t is employment, A and ¾ are positive constants,
and 0 < ¾ < 1. Each …rm faces a product demand function of the form
qDi;t =
µ
pi;t
pt
¶¡´ qDt
f
; (3.2)
where qDt stands for aggregate product demand (to be speci…ed below), f is the
number of …rms, pi;t is the price charged by …rm i, pt is the aggregate price level,
and ´ is the price elasticity of product demand (a positive constant).
The …rm’s pro…t-maximizing employment decision sets its marginal revenue
(MRi;t = pi;t
³
1¡ 1´
´
) equal to its marginal cost (MCi;t = !i;t
³
@ni;t
@qi;t
´
= !i;t¾A n
1¡¾
i;t
where !i;t is the wage paid by the …rm). Thus the …rm’s labor demand is given by
!i;t
¾A n
1¡¾
i;t = pi;t
³
1¡ 1´
´
: In the labor market equilibrium, pi;t = pt and !i;t = !t,
due to symmetry. Aggregating all the individual …rms’ labor demand functions
and taking logarithms, so that Nt = log (fni;t), we obtain the following aggregate
employment equation:
Nt = a¡ aw (Wt ¡ Pt) ; (3.3)
where Wt = log (!t), Pt = log (pt) ; a =
log(1¡ 1´)+log(¾A)+(1¡¾) log f
1¡¾ , and aw =
1
1¡¾ .
As above, the labor supply is constant (equation (2.5). Our aggregate price
equation is equivalent to the aggregate employment equation under product mar-
ket clearing. The product market clearing condition is fAn¾i;t = qDt : Taking logs,
de…ning h = log (Af1¡¾) and QDt = log
¡
qDt
¢
, and rearranging gives: Nt =
1
¾Q
D
t ¡ h¾ : Substituting this equation into the aggregate employment equation
(3.3), we obtain the following price equation:17
Pt =Wt + ½QDt ¡ ¯; (3.4)
where ½ = 1¾aw =
1¡¾
¾ ; and ¯ =
a
aw
+ h¾aw :
Our nominal frictions are the staggered wage contracts of Taylor (1979, 1980a).
Along the standard lines, we suppose that there are two wage contracts, evenly
staggered, each lasting for two periods. Let -t be the (log of the) contract wage
negotiated at the beginning of period t for periods t and t+1: Taylor’s staggered
contract equation is
-t = ®-t¡1 + (1¡ ®)Et-t+1 + ° (c+ ®¡t + (1¡ ®)Et¡t+1) + ³t; (3.5)
where ³t is a white noise process, ®, °, and c are positive constants, and Et is
the expectations operator, denoting the expectation conditional on information
17To see this, rewrite the employment equation as Pt = ¡ aaw + Wt +
1
aw
Nt:
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available at time t. We assume that agents do not have information about ³
when they set their wage contracts at time t; so Et³t = 0: The variable ¡t is what
Taylor calls “excess demand,” speci…ed as actual output (Qst) less full-employment
output (in logs). By the production function (3.1), full-employment output is
Qst = ¾L + h; or Qt = ¾L + h since we assume that the product market clears.
Thus excess demand (in logs) is
¡t = Qt ¡ ¾L¡ h: (3.6)
The microfoundations of the contract equation under time discounting18 - which,
for brevity, we need not summarize here - indicate that the coe¢cient ® is a
discounting parameter equal to 11+± , where ± is the discount factor.
19 ° is a
“demand sensitivity parameter” (describing how strongly wages are in‡uenced by
demand), and c as a “cost-push parameter” (describing the upward pressure on
wages in the absence of excess demand). Since ± < 1, we infer that ® > 1=2, i.e.
discounting gives rise to an asymmetry in wage determination: the current wage
-t is a¤ected more strongly by the past wage -t¡1 than the future expected wage
Et-t+1.
The average wage is
Wt =
1
2
(-t +-t¡1) : (3.7)
Aggregate demand
¡
QDt
¢
is depends on real money balances
QDt =Mt ¡ Pt; (3.8)
whereMt is the log of the money supply. (For brevity, again, we omit the standard
microfoundations.)
Finally, money growth follows a random walk (equation (2.1)). This implies
that the contract wage may be expressed in terms of its own lagged value and the
money supply:20
-t = (1¡ ¸1) (1 + ½) (c¡ ¾L¡ h) + (1¡ ¸1) ¯ + ¸1-t¡1
+ (1¡ ¸1)Mt +(1¡ ¸1)¹t + ³t; (3.9)
18Ascari (2000), Ascari and Rankin (2002), Graham and Snower (2002), Helpman and Lei-
derman (1990), and others. See also Huang and Liu (2002).
19Since this result is derived by linearizing a wage equation around a steady state of zero
money growth, the theoretical analysis of this section applies only to money growth rates that
are su¢ciently low.
20To see this, substitute the price equation (3.4) and the wage equation (3.7) into the aggregate
demand equation (3.8):
Qt =
µ
1
1 + ½
¶
Mt ¡
1
2 (1 + ½)
(-t + -t¡1) +
¯
1 + ½
:
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where ¸1;2 =
Á2¨
p
Á22¡4Á1Á3
2Á3
; and = ¸2¸2¡1 ¡ ®: It can be shown that 0 < ¸1 < 1
and ¸2 > 1 when 0 < ° < 2 (1 + ½) :
Substituting (3.9) into (3.7), we obtain the aggregate nominal wage dynamics
equation:
Wt = (1¡ ¸1) (1 + ½) (c ¡ ¾L¡ h) + (1¡ ¸1) ¯ + ¸1Wt¡1 + (1¡ ¸1)Mt
+
µ
¡
1
2
¶
(1¡ ¸1)¹t ¡
1
2
(1¡ ¸1) "t +
1
2
¡
³t + ³t¡1
¢
: (3.10)
Note that in the long-run, wage in‡ation is equal to the money growth rate:
¢WLRt = ¹LRt :21
To derive the dynamics of the real wage, we …rst express price in terms of
wages and money (i.e., insert (3.8) into (3.4)):
Pt = (1¡ µ)Wt + µMt ¡ (1¡ µ) ¯; (3.11)
where µ = 11+½ : Observe that equation (3.10) and (3.11) imply that in the long-
run, in‡ation is equal to the money growth: ¼LRt = ¹LRt : Substituting (3.10) into
Next, substitute this equation and (3.6) into the contract equation (3.5):
-t = ®-t¡1 + (1 ¡ ®)Et-t+1 + ° (c ¡ ¾L ¡ h) +
¯
1 + ½
+ ³t
+°®
µ
1
1 + ½
¶
Mt ¡
1
2 (1 + ½)
(-t + -t¡1)
¸
+° (1 ¡ ®)
µ
1
1 + ½
¶
EtMt+1 ¡
1
2 (1 + ½)
(Et-t+1 + -t)
¸
:
Apply the expectations operator Et on the above equation, recall that Et³t = 0; collect terms
together, so that
Á1Et-t¡1 + Á2Et-t + Á3Et-t+1 = ¡° (1 + ½) (c ¡ ¾L ¡ h) ¡ °¯
¡° [®EtMt + (1 ¡ ®)EtMt+1] ;
where Á1 = ®
¡
1 + ½ ¡ °2
¢
; Á2 =
¡
1 + ½ + °2
¢
; Á3 = (1 ¡ ®)
¡
1 + ½ ¡ °2
¢
:
Assuming that the contract wage -t is dynamically stable, the rational expectations solution
of the previous equation is given by (3.9).
21The wage in‡ation equation is given by the …rst di¤erence of (3.10):
(1 ¡ ¸1B)¢Wt = (1 ¡ ¸1)¹t +
µ
¡
1
2
¶
(1 ¡ ¸1) "t
¡
1
2
(1 ¡ ¸1)¢"t +
1
2
¡
¢³t + ¢³t¡1
¢
;
where B, ¢ are the backshift and …rst di¤erence operators, respectively. The long-run solution of
the above equation is obtained by setting the error terms (³t; "t) equal to zero and the backshift
operator B equal to unity.
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(3.11), we …nd the real wage dynamics equation:22
Wt ¡ Pt = (1¡ ¸1) (c¡ ¾L ¡ h + ¯) + ¸1 (Wt¡1 ¡ Pt¡1) ¡ (1¡ ¸1)
µ
2®¡ 1
°
¶
¹t
¡
µ
2
(1¡ ¸1) "t +
µ
2
¡
³t + ³t¡1
¢
: (3.12)
Inserting this real wage into the employment equation (3.3) and the unem-
ployment rate (2.6), we derive the unemployment dynamics equation:
ut = (1¡ ¸1) (1¡ aw¾)L+ (1¡ ¸1) [aw (c+ ¯ ¡ h)¡ a] + ¸1ut¡1
¡ aw (1¡ ¸1)
µ
2® ¡ 1
°
¶
¹t ¡ aw
µ
2
(1¡ ¸1) "t + aw
µ
2
¡
³t + ³t¡1
¢
; (3.13)
Thus the long-run unemployment rate is
uLRt = (1¡ aw¾)L+ aw (c+ ¯ ¡ h)¡ a¡ aw
µ
2®¡ 1
°
¶
¹LRt : (3.14)
Given that ¼LRt = ¹LRt ; the long-run Phillips curve is23
¼LRt = ¡
° (1¡ ¾)
(2®¡ 1)
uLRt +
µ
°
2® ¡ 1
¶
c+ (1¡ 2¾)
µ
L +
h
¾
¶¸
: (3.15)
Note that, since 12 < ® < 1; there is a tradeo¤ between in‡ation and unemploy-
ment both in the short-run and the long-run.24
As we can see, the long-run Phillips curve is ‡atter,
22Equations (3.10) and (3.11) imply
Wt ¡ Pt = (1 ¡ ¸1) (c ¡ ¾L ¡ h + ¯) + ¸1 (Wt¡1 ¡ Pt¡1)
¡µ

1
2
(1 + ¸1) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸1)
¸
¹t ¡
µ
2
(1 ¡ ¸1) "t +
µ
2
¡
³t + ³t¡1
¢
:
It can be shown that µ
£1
2 (1 + ¸1) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸1)
¤
= (1 ¡ ¸1)
³
2®¡1
°
´
; and thus we obtain (3.12).
23Speci…cally, the long-run Phillips curve is
¼LRt = ¡
°
aw (2® ¡ 1)
uLRt +
° [(1 ¡ aw¾)L + aw (c + ¯ ¡ h) ¡ a]
aw (2® ¡ 1)
:
Recalling that aw = 11¡¾ and ¯ =
a
aw +
h
¾aw , substituting these expressions into the above
equation, and through some algebraic manipulation, we obtain the long-run Phillips curve (3.15).
24Of course, this occurs under diminishing returns to labor (0 < ¾ < 1) : Increasing returns
to labor will produce an upward-sloping Phillips curve.
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² the greater is the real interest rate, and thus the more backward-looking is
the wage contract (i.e. the greater is ®), and
² the less sensitive is the contract wage to aggregate demand (i.e. the lower
is °)
² the greater is ¾, i.e., the less diminishing are the returns to labor.
Intuitively, when ® or ° falls, the average nominal wage - and therefore the
price level - responds more slowly to an increase in money growth. Thus a given
increase in money growth leads to a larger increase in the real wage, a larger rise
in labor demand, and thus a a larger decline in unemployment.
It is easy to see that, for parameter values common in the literature, the long-
run Phillips curve is far from vertical. We can express the slope of this Phillips
curve as ¡°(2+r)(1¡¾)r , where r is the real discount rate (± =
1
1+r ). When ¾ = 0:75
and ° is 0.1,25 the slope is -2.53 for a real discount rate of 2 percent, and it is
-1.03 for a real discount rate of 5 percent.
It is important to emphasize, however, that the real wage channel is unlikely to
be operative in isolation. Indeed, the theoretical model above is far too narrowly
focused to generate reliable measures of the in‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤. We
can gain a broader perspective through an estimated macro model, to which we
now turn.
4. Empirical implementation
This section applies our analysis of the in‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤ to an em-
pirical investigation of the Spanish economy. Spain is a particularly interesting
country for such an analysis, since it has witnessed major institutional and pol-
icy changes over the sample period - the transition to democracy, the advent of
unionized collective wage bargaining, several waves of labor market reforms, entry
into the EEC, and central bank independence, to name a few. In our empirical
analysis below, we attempt a rough assessment of how such changes in‡uenced
the Phillips curve.26 Due to data limitations, however, our results should be seen
as merely a tentative, …rst step towards a full-blown empirical reappraisal of the
Phillips curve on the basis of frictional growth.
25There is broad disagreement about the appropriate value of °. Empirical estimates range
from around 0.5 to 0.1 (see, for example, Taylor (1980b) and Sachs (1980)), whereas calibration
of microfounded models often assigns values between 0.2 and 1 (see, for example, Huang and
Liu (2002)).
26Appendix A presents a short account of these major events.
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We …rst present estimates of a structural model of the Spanish economy, in
which context the long-run in‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤ can be derived. We
then investigate how various important institutional and policy changes in Spain
over the past few decades may have a¤ected this tradeo¤.
4.1. The Empirical Model
Modeling the in‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤ involves some hard choices. Since
our theory rests on lagged labor market responses to money growth, we can gain
a broad macro perspective on the underlying propagation mechanisms by con-
sidering a wide set of lagged responses in employment, wage setting, and labor
force participation activities. Moreover, since our theory is concerned with the
way in which wage and price adjustments in‡uence real economic activities, our
empirical model contains a nominal wage equation and a price equation, as well
as careful structural speci…cations of employment and labor force participation
equations.27 Thus we assess the long-run in‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤ by es-
timating a multi-equation system, rather than the more common single-equation,
reduced-form Phillips curve. Our analysis indicates that the interactions among
our various adjustment processes play a signi…cant role in determining the long-
run in‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤.
Since Spain has witnessed several profound policy changes over the past three
decades (see Appendix A for a discussion) we attempt to capture shifts of policy
regimes through the use of dummy variables in our empirical model. This is a
transparently rough procedure, but di¢cult to re…ne in macroestimation.
Finally, we endeavor to take seriously the common …nding that productiv-
ity growth and capital accumulation play an important role in determining em-
ployment and unemployment. Thus productivity and the capital stock are not
exogenous variables in our analysis;28 rather, our empirical model includes an ag-
gregate production function, relating output to employment and capital, and a
capital stock equation, containing further lagged endogenous variables.
This leaves us with a sizable econometric model, comprising seven equations:
employment, labor force, wage, price, and capital stock equations, as well as a pro-
duction function and the de…nition of the unemployment rate. This leaves us with
27Empirical macroeconomic models of the Spanish labor market have tended to focus on
employment rather than the labor force. A signi…cant exception is De Lamo and Dolado (1993).
28Just as the costs of buying and selling (or depreciating) capital make investment deci-
sions intertemporal, so the costs of hiring, training and …ring labor make employment decisions
intertemporal as well. Thus, we view …rms as making their employment, investment, and pro-
duction decisions together, with reference to broadly similar time horizons. On this account
it appears inadvisable to hold the capital stock and productivity constant when estimating an
employment equation.
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fewer degrees of freedom than we might ideally wish for, but more than enough
to identify well-speci…ed structural equations. There is a well-known tradeo¤
between structural detail and the power of econometric tests and our empirical
model favors the structural detail.
Our theoretical analysis and attention to policy changes have led us to chose
structural modeling rather than the VAR approach.29 The structural models are
able to give more attention to policy variables and other exogenous variables
outside the labor market, which tend not to be included in the VAR models.
Our estimation uses OECD annual data over a sample from 1966 to 1998.30
The de…nitions of variables are given in Table 1.
Table 1: De…nitions of variables
Mt money supply (M3) Nt employment
Pt price level (GDP de‡ator) Lt labor supply
Wt nominal wages ut unemployment rate
wt real wage (Wt ¡ Pt) Zt working age population
mt real money balances (Mt ¡ Pt) ¿ t indirect taxes as a % of GDP
µt real labor productivity bt real social security bene…ts
yt real GDP P It import price level
kt real capital stock ct competitiveness ( import priceGDP de‡ator )
t linear time trend
djt =
½
1; for t = j; :::; 1998; j > 1971
0; otherwise
¾
d71t =
½
1; for t = 1971
0; otherwise
¾
All variables are in logs except for the unemployment rate ut and the tax rate ¿ t:
For any variable xt in our data set, slope dummies are given by xjt = d
j
txt:
We …rst estimated each of the equations in our model using the autoregres-
sive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration analysis,31 and used the
Akaike and Schwarz information criteria to determine the optimal lag-length. The
selected speci…cations are dynamically stable (i.e., the roots of their autoregres-
sive polynomia lie outside the unit circle), and pass the standard diagnostic tests
29Both approaches have received ample attention in empirical labor market studies. Following
Blanchard and Quah (1989), a number of the recent studies devoted to the Spanish labor market
analysis opt for the structural VAR approach. For instance, Dolado and Jimeno (1997), Andrés
et al. (1998) or Dolado et al. (2000) estimate VAR models. On the other hand, the structural
modeling approach, in a partial equilibrium setting, has been followed by others, e.g. Andrés et
al. (1990) or Blanchard et al. (1995).
301998 is the last year that data is available on the individual money supply series of the EMU
countries.
31Pesaran and Shin (1995), Pesaran (1997), and Pesaran et al. (1996), show that the tradi-
tional ARDL estimation procedure can be applied even when the variables follow I(1) processes.
(See also Henry, Karanassou, and Snower (2000) for an application of this approach and a
discussion of its merits.)
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(for no serial correlation, linearity, normality, homoskedasticity, and constancy of
the parameters of interest) at conventional signi…cance levels.32 An important
implication of the above methodology is that the long-run solution of the ARDL
can be interpreted as the cointegrating vector of the variables involved (since an
ARDL equation can be reparameterized as an error correction one).
Next, the following plausible restrictions were imposed on the model and ac-
cepted by the data: (i) constant returns to scale in production33, (ii) the long-run
elasticity of the labor force with respect to the working age population is unity,
and (iii) absence of money illusion.34 Finally, we estimated the equations of our
macro model as a system, using three stages least squares (3SLS), to take into
account potential endogeneity of the regressors and cross equation correlation.
Tables 2a and 2b present the restricted 3SLS estimates of each equation.35 In
the nominal wage equation, the explanatory variables have coe¢cients of plausible
magnitudes and signs, e.g. wages are inversely related to the unemployment rate
and positively related to productivity. The price equation has a similar structure
to the wage equation. Higher wages contribute to rise prices, but with some delay,
and with a substantially smaller e¤ect than prices on wages. Money supply exerts
a greater in‡uence on prices than on wages in the short-run.
32See Tables A1-A6 in Appendix B.
33The sum of the labor and capital coe¢cients in our Cobb-Douglas production function is
unity.
34That is, the equations in our model are homogeneous of degree zero in all nominal variables.
This restriction was imposed and accepted in the wage and price equations, and it automatically
holds in all other equations since the real endogenous variables only depend on real variables.
35Figures A2 in Appendix B picture the actual and …tted values of the unemployment and
in‡ation rates. The plots indicate that our model tracks the data very well.
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Table 2a: Spanish model, 3SLS, 1966-1998.
Dependent variable: Wt Dependent variable: Pt Dependent variable: Lt
coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat.
Cnt 5:36 (6:79) Cnt ¡7:02 (¡10:8) Cnt 0:02 (0:64)
Wt¡1 0:66 (7:69) Pt¡1 0:57 (4:65) Lt¡1 0:85 (19:3)
W 74t¡1 ¡0:002 (¡2:69) P 79t¡1 ¡0:017 (¡7:18) ¢Lt¡2 ¡0:29 (¡1:97)
W 84t¡1 ¡0:003 (¡4:95) P 87t¡1 ¡0:005 (¡2:16) wt ¡0:01 (¡1:85)
W 87t¡1 ¡0:005 (¡7:77) Pt¡2 ¡0:27 (¡4:11) ¢ut ¡0:18 (¡3:69)
W 97t¡1 ¡0:001 (¡2:52) Wt¡1 0:43 (5:95) Zt 0.15 (+)
Wt¡2 ¡0:44 (¡6:35) Mt 0.28 (¤)
Pt 0:68 (8:22) M 88t 0:002 (2:98)
P 89t ¡0:008 (¡4:96) M 94t 0:0002 (0:83)
Mt 0.12 (¤) µt ¡1:04 (¡10:6)
ut¡1 ¡0:40 (¡3:84) P It 0:04 (3:34)
µt 0:55 (4:51) P I;77t 0:013 (5:51)
P It 0:08 (5:16) P
I;86
t 0:007 (4:21)
(¤) restricted coe¢cient for no money illusion in the long-run; ¢ denotes the di¤erence operator;
(+) coe¢cient is restricted so that the long-run elasticity with respect to Zt is unity..
In the labor force equation, the size of the labor force depends on its own
past values (due to, say, monetary and psychic costs of entry and exit from labor
force participation). It also depends negatively on the real wage, implying that
the income e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect.36 This negative sign appears
plausible for Spain, where income sharing among adult members of families is
common, so that a rise in the wage of the main bread winner reduces the need for
the spouse and children to seek work37. Finally, the labor force depends inversely
on the change in the unemployment rate. This may be interpreted as a type of
discouraged worker e¤ect: the greater the increase in the unemployment rate, the
greater the level of long-term unemployment, ceteris paribus, and the greater the
likelihood of exit from the labor force38.
36This reduces the in‡uence of the real wage channel, contained in the employment equation.
37This argument is supported by the fact that the unemployment rate of the main bread
winners is half that of the second earner one and one third that of the corresponding child earners.
These di¤erences are largest in regions with the highest unemployment rates. Furthermore, data
from the 1990 Household Budget Survey (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares, EPF) show that
the net wage of the main bread winner was 1.390.091 pts. in that year, more than 40% higher
than the one of the second earner (813.038 pts.) and twice the one of the child earners (684.700
pts.).
38From 1986 to 1990, the 1.7 million newly employed reduced unemployment only by 0.5
milion.
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Table 2b: Spanish model, 3SLS, 1966-1998.
Dependent variable: Nt Dependent variable: kt Dependent variable: yt
coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat.
Cnt ¡0:17 (¡0:61) Cnt ¡0:10 (¡0:63) Cnt 0:17 (5:67)
Nt¡1 0:86 (14:6) kt¡1 1:39 (14:0) yt¡1 0:50 (3:07)
N74t¡1 ¡0:001 (¡2:98) kt¡2 ¡0:66 (¡5:93) yt¡2 ¡0:31 (¡2:50)
N84t¡1 ¡0:001 (¡1:81) kt¡3 0:18 (3:47) kt 0:38 (5:11)
N93t¡1 ¡0:002 (¡9:95) Nt 0:22 (6:34) k75t ¡0:001 (¡2:21)
kt 0:64 (4:70) Nt¡1 ¡0:12 (¡2:11) Nt 0.43 (¤)
kt¡1 ¡1:34 (¡6:21) Nt¡2 ¡0.01 (¤) N84t 0:002 (3:90)
kt¡2 0.84 (¤) µt 0:19 (3:90) t 0:005 (3:28)
wt ¡0:16 (¡6:53) µt¡1 ¡0:09 (¡1:82) t78 ¡0:002 (¡3:82)
µt¡1 0:30 (3:04) mt 0:04 (3:08)
µ79t¡1 0:02 (2:82) wt¡1 ¡0:03 (¡2:06)
¢Lt 0:75 (5:10) ct¡1 ¡0:01 (¡3:72)
bt ¡0:21 (¡13:9) ¿ t¡1 ¡0:41 (¡4:75)
¿ t ¡0:24 (¡1:44) d71 ¡0:014 (¡6:11)
d71 0:01 (2:67)
(¤) restricted coe¢cient for constant returns to scale.
In the employment equation, labor demand depends, among other things, on
the real wage, the capital stock and productivity39. Restricting the long-run
coe¢cient of the capital stock to unity is accepted by the data, implying constant
returns to scale, which are also features in the production function. Employment
also depends negatively on the real wage (representing the real wage channel,
analyzed above), social security bene…ts per employee (reducing work e¤ort by
improving workers’ outside options) and the indirect tax rate. The capital stock
equation is analogous to the employment equation. Constant returns to scale
is accepted: the long-run elasticity of capital stock with respect to labor can be
restricted to one. Productivity has a positive in‡uence on capital stock. Real
wages, competitiveness, and the indirect tax rate have negative e¤ects. Real
money balances have a positive e¤ect (working,say, via credit constraints and the
real interest rate); they represent the real money balance channel analyzed above.
Finally, the production function is standard, displaying constant returns to scale.
As noted, we endeavor to capture institutional and policy changes - henceforth
39Note that employment also depends on the change in the labor force. A rationale is devel-
oped in Coles and Smith (1996), which argues that job matches depend more on new entrants
to the labor force than on the level of the labor force, since …rms’ search primarily for new job
applicants, rather than review the old ones. Thus the greater the increase in the labor force, the
greater the number of new job applicants, and the greater the consequent number of matches.
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called IPCs - through multiplicative dummy variables, as shown in Table 3. The
introduction of unionized wage bargaining, beginning in 1973 (unions were not
formally legalized till 1977), reduced wage persistence (as many of the Franco-
era employment regulations were scrapped) and employment persistence. As is
well known, after the …rst oil price shock Spanish production became less capi-
tal intensive. The Moncloa Pacts reduced domestic price persistence (by making
prices more ‡exible) and increased the in‡uence of productivity swings on em-
ployment (by reducing …rms’ incentives to hoard labor). The …rst wage of labor
market reforms reduced wage and employment persistence. Spain’s entry into the
EEC in 1986 reduced wage and price persistence, and augmented the in‡uence
of money on prices (via increased credibility of monetary policy).40 Spain’s entry
into the EMS in 1989 reduced the e¤ect of domestic prices on wages. The second
wave of labor market reforms, announced in 1993, further reduced employment
persistence. And …nally, the third wave of reforms reduced wage persistence.
Table 3: Institutional and Policy Changes (IPCs)
1. Introduction of unionized wage bargaining: W 74t¡1 and N74t¡1
2. Oil price shock: k75t
3. The Moncloa Pacts: P 79t¡1 and µ
79
t¡1
4. First wave of labor market reforms: W 84t¡1, N 84t¡1, and N84t
5. Entry into the EEC: W 87t¡1, P 87t¡1, M 88t
6. Entry into the EMS: P 89t
7. Second wave of labor market reforms: N93t¡1
8. Third wave of labor market reforms: W 97t¡1
In this way our structural model of the Spanish economy endeavors to capture
the interplay between macro shocks and lagged adjustment processes that are
central to our analysis of the in‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤, as well as the
in‡uence of institutional and policy changes on this tradeo¤.41
5. The Spanish Phillips curve
In the context of the empirical model above, given by the restricted 3SLS esti-
mates, we now assess the slope of the long-run Phillips curve for Spain. We then
examine how this tradeo¤ was a¤ected by institutional and policy changes.
40M94t aims to serve a similar purpose with regard to central bank independence.
41As the …gures in Appendix B show, our model …ts the data closely.
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5.1. The Long-Run In‡ation-Unemployment Trade-o¤
To derive the slope of the long-run Phillips curve, we begin with a change in
the growth rate of the money supply and simulate the associated changes in the
long-run in‡ation and unemployment rates. The change in money growth may be
interpreted as realization of the stochastic process generating the money growth
rates, and thus our analysis is not subject to the Lucas critique. In particular,
the money supply may be treated as an I(2) variable,42 so that changes in the
money growth rate are permanent. Since our empirical model is linear and thus
the implied Phillips curve is linear as well, the size of the money growth change
clearly makes no di¤erence to our estimated slope of the long-run Phillips curve.
We let our initial money growth rate be 15% and our …nal one be 5%. These values
were derived by estimating the Kernel density function for the growth rate of the
money supply (along the same lines as Bianchi and Zoega (1998), for example).43
For the initial and …nal money growth rates above, we let all the endogenous
variables in our system converge to their long-run steady state growth rates, given
the dummy variables that obtain at the end of our sample period. We thereby …nd
the change in the long-run in‡ation and unemployment rates associated with the
change in the money growth rate, enabling us to derive the slope of the long-run
Phillips curve at the end of our sample period.44
The simulation exercise indicates that the above 10% reduction in money
growth leads to a permanent increase of 3.70% in the unemployment rate, along
with a permanent decrease of 10% in the in‡ation rate. Thus our model implies
that the slope of the Spanish long-run Phillips curve is d¼=du = ¡2:7 (to the
nearest two signi…cant digits) at the end of our sample period.45
Of course this estimate of the slope pertains only to the range of observed
variations in the in‡ation and unemployment rates. It is not permissible to ex-
trapolate outside this observed range. Indeed, there are good theoretical reasons
(lying beyond the scope of our theoretical model above) to believe that the long-
run Phillips is nonlinear over a wider range and that the slope may turn vertical
or even positive when the long-run in‡ation rate is su¢ciently high.
42The Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Phillips Peron (PP) tests indicate that we cannot reject the I(2)
hypothesis for the money supply. In particular, for ¢Mt we have DF= ¡0:26 and PP= ¡:41; the
5% critical value is ¡2:95: (For ¢2Mt the DF and PP tests are ¡4:91 and ¡7:96; respectively.)
43The results on this estimation are reported in Appendix C.
44Since the model is linear, the evolution of the exogenous variables has no in‡uence on the
slope of the long-run Phillips curve. Thus these exogenous variables can be set to zero in the
simulation exercise.
45The in‡uence of previous institutional and policy changes is examined below.
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5.2. The In‡uence of Institutional and Policy Changes on the Long-Run
Phillips Curve
In our model, as we have seen, some of the institutional and policy changes (cap-
tured by the dummy variables above) a¤ect the labor market adjustment pro-
cesses, and these processes - interacting with money growth - a¤ect the slope of
the long-run Phillips curve. We now assess the magnitude and signi…cance of this
in‡uence.
In the absence of all IPCs - at the beginning of our sample period - we …nd
that the slope of the long-run Phillips curve is Sn = ¡1:89 (where the subscript
n stands for “no IPC”). This is the base-run case.
Next, we add the …rst IPC to the base run, and we obtain the associated long-
run Phillips curve slope.46. We call this slope S1. We derive the contribution of
…rst IPC (S^1) by subtracting Sn from S1: S^1 = S1 ¡ Sn.
Analogously, we add the second IPC to the previous system, and evaluate the
slope of the associated long-run Phillips curve in the presence of the …rst and
second IPCs, to be called S2. The contribution of IPC 2 is then measured as
S^2 = S2 ¡ S1. Along these lines, we evaluate the individual contribution of each
IPC to the long-run Phillips curve slope. The results are given in Table 4. The
top section of the table shows the in‡uence of a 10 percentage points decrease
in money growth (¢M) on unemployment (¢u) and the slope of the long-run
Phillips curve. The bottom section gives the individual contributions of each IPC
to the slope (S^i) and the percentage di¤erence (%) in the slope implied by each
IPC.47
Observe that the IPCs which appear to have had the greatest impact are
the introduction of the Moncloa Pacts and entry into the EEC and EMS. Our
calculations show that these changes all made the Spanish long-run Phillips curve
steeper.
46Speci…cally, this is the slope in the presence of IPC 1 but in the absence of all other IPCs.
After including the …rst IPC, we reimpose on the macro system the restrictions to ensure no
money illusion and constant returns to scale.
47For example, entry into the EEC shifts the slope from -2.28 to -2.51 (in the top part of the
table), which corresponds to a di¤erence of -0.23 percentage points that makes the slope 10.1%
steeper (in the bottom part of the table).
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Table 4: The long-run Phillips curve slope.
Unemployment rate response to a 10 %points decrease in ¢M
Cumulative impact of IPCs ¢u slope
Trade-o¤ before 1973 (Sn) 5.29 -1.89
IPC 1 (S1) 5.22 -1.92
IPCs 1+2 (S2) 5.25 -1.91
IPCs 1+2+3 (S3) 4.47 -2.24
IPCs 1+2+3+4 (S4) 4.38 -2.28
IPCs 1+2+3+4+5 (S5) 3.98 -2.51
IPCs 1+2+3+4+5+6 (S6) 3.74 -2.67
IPCs 1+2+3+4+5+6+7 (S7) 3.76 -2.66
All IPCs considered (1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8) (S8) 3.70 -2.70
Individual contribution of IPCs S^i (%)
1. Introduction of unionized wage bargaining (S^1) 0.03 -1.6
2. First oil price shock (S^2) -0.01 0.5
3. Institutional changes associated with the Moncloa Pacts (S^3) 0.33 -17.3
4. First wave of labor market reforms (S^4) 0.04 -1.8
5. Entry into the EEC (S^5) 0.23 -10.1
6. Entry into the EMS (S^6) 0.16 -6.4
7. Second wave of labor market reforms (S^7) -0.01 0.4
8. Third wave of labor market reforms (S^8) 0.04 -1.5
(%) percentage di¤erence with respect to the case without any of the IPCs considered.
5.3. Monte Carlo Simulations
We now examine whether our point estimates of the long-run Phillips curve slope
are signi…cantly di¤erent from in…nity. Accordingly, we conduct Monte Carlo ex-
periments, each of which consists of 1000 replications. In each replication (i),
a vector of error terms "(i)t =
³
"(i)1t ; "
(i)
2t ; "
(i)
3t ; "
(i)
4t ; "
(i)
5t ; "
(i)
6t
´0
(of the labor demand,
nominal wage, price, labor force, capital stock, and production equations, respec-
tively) was drawn from the normal distribution,48 N(0;
P
). The vector "(i)t was
then added to the vector of estimated equations to generate a new vector of en-
dogenous variables y(i)t =
³
N (i)t ;W
(i)
t ; p
(i)
t ; L
(i)
t ; k
(i)
t ; y
(i)
t ; u
(i)
t = L
(i)
t ¡N
(i)
t
´
. Next,
the equations of the model were estimated using the new vector of endogenous
variables y(i)t , and the set of exogenous variables. Finally, the above simulation
exercises for the computation of the long-run Phillips curve slope were conducted
48We used the normal distribution because the assumption of normality is valid in the esti-
mated system of equations. Thus "t » N (0;
P
), where
P
is the variance-covariance matrix of
the estimated model.
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on the newly estimated system. In this way, each replication (i) yielded a set of
measures for the cumulative impact of IPCs on the long-run Phillips curve slope:
xi =
n
S(i)n ; S(i)1 ; S
(i)
2 ; S
(i)
3 ; S
(i)
4 ; S
(i)
5 ; S
(i)
6 ; S
(i)
7 ; S
(i)
8
o
. We grouped the values of each
generated series xi into class intervals of 0.5 units. In Table 5 we present the per-
centage count of slopes within speci…c class intervals. For example, in the presence
of all IPCs, the probability that the long-run Phillips curve slope is below -50 is
1.3%. Using as a cut-o¤ point a 2% count, there is no class interval below [-6,-5.5)
or above [-1,-0.5) that contains at least 2% of the values of each xi. So in Table 5
we also give the probability that the long-run Phillips curve slope is greater than
-6.0 and smaller that -0.5.
Observe that in the absence of all IPCs the probability that the slope of the
Phillips curve (Sn) is in the [-6, -0.5) interval is 77.7%. The Phillips curve slope
remains more or less una¤ected by the introduction of unionized wage bargaining
and the occurrence of the oil price shock (see columns S1 and S2; respectively, in
Table 5). However, when the institutional changes associated with the Moncloa
Pacts are introduced, the Phillips curve slope becomes steeper (column S3 in Table
5). In this case the probability that the slope lies between -6 and -0.5 drops to
72.3%. The Phillips curve slope does not change much when the …rst wave of labor
market reforms takes place (column S4 in Table 5). But with the entry into the
EEC the probability that the slope lies in the [-6, -0.5) interval further decreases
to 67.6%, thus the Phillips curve gets steeper (column S5 in Table 5). Finally, the
entry into the EMS,49 and the second and third waves of labor market reforms do
not appear to have a signi…cant impact on the Phillips curve slope (column S6;
S7; and S8 in Table 5).
Table 5: Monte Carlo simulations, 1000 replications
probability (%) that the PC slope is within a speci…c interval
Sn S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8
(¡1;¡50) 0.5 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.3
(¡1;¡20) 2.1 2.6 2.6 2.1 2.6 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.6
[¡6;¡0:5) 77.7 76.8 76.8 72.3 71.1 67.6 65.5 65.9 65.3
6. Conclusions
This paper has provided a theoretical rationale for a long-run tradeo¤ between
in‡ation and unemployment due to the interplay between money growth and
49The result concerning EMS contrasts with our …nding in Table 4.
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nominal frictions. In this context we have seen that the absence of money illusion
and money neutrality does not prevent changes in money growth from having
long-run e¤ects on unemployment (as well as in‡ation, of course). Thereby our
analysis avoids the counterfactual prediction of the NAIRU theory that in‡ation
falls without limit when unemployment is high.
Our analysis suggests a signi…cant role for monetary policy in combating Span-
ish unemployment in the long run. This role, however, has been reduced somewhat
through successive policy changes, particularly the introduction of the Moncloa
Pacts and Spain’s entry into the EEC and possibly the EMS.
Our empirical model yields a point estimate of -1.89 for the slope of the Spanish
long-run Phillips curve at the beginning of our sample period (so that a 10%
decrease in money growth leads to a permanent rise in unemployment by 5.3
percentage points) and a point estimate of -2.70 at the end of our sample period (so
that a 10% decrease in money growth leads to a permanent rise in unemployment
by 3.7 percentage points). Our Kernel density analysis captures two broad money
growth regimes, one at 15% (predominantly at the beginning of the sample period)
and one at 5% (predominantly at the end). In short, our analysis suggests that
this policy regime change had a pronounced e¤ect on Spain’s long-run employment
rate.
Not surprisingly, the short- and medium-run e¤ects on unemployment may
be even more powerful. For instance, Spain experienced a precipitate fall in
money growth over the 1990s, largely in response to the convergence criteria
of the Maastricht Treaty (signed in February 1992), Spain’s EMS crisis (from
September 1992 to August 1993), and the independence of the Bank of Spain
(granted in June 1994). In the context of our empirical model, we can ask how
much of the rise in Spanish unemployment since 1993 can be accounted for by the
experienced changes in money growth. Although it is important to emphasize that
our empirical model is merely illustrative, Figures 1 nevertheless tell an interesting
tale.
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Figures 1: Unemployment and In‡ation E¤ects Attributable to Monetary Policy
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Figure 1a gives the trajectory of the actual unemployment rate vis-a-vis the one
the unemployment rate would have followed, in our model, if money growth had
remained constant at its 1993 rate. The di¤erence between the two trajectories
stands for the rise in unemployment, through time, that is attributable to the fall
in money growth. Along the same lines, Figure 1b depicts the trajectory of actual
in‡ation against the one the simulated in‡ation rate under money growth …xed at
its 1993 rate, so that the di¤erence stands for the fall in in‡ation, through time,
that is attributabe to the decline in money growth. In this simple accounting
exercise, we see that, by 1998, the contractionary monetary policy accounts for
a rise in the Spanish unemployment rate of about 4 percentage points and a
fall in the in‡ation rate of also about 4 percentage points. In short, our model
suggests that monetary policy has had a very substantial and prolonged e¤ect on
unemployment (and of course in‡ation). Our empirical analysis of Spain’s long-
run in‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤ indicates that some of this unemployment
e¤ect is permanent.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: An Overview of In‡ation and Unemployment
in Spain
The story of the Spanish economy over the past 25 years is one of declining
in‡ation and persistent unemployment, as shown in Figures A1 and Figure 3a
in the text. The rate of in‡ation has gradually declined from 24.5% in 1977 to
1.8% in 1998, permitting Spain to join the EMU in 1999. The unemployment rate
started low - below 5% until 1976 - but reached more than 21% in 1985. After
hovering near this peak for another decade, it has since fallen to less than 15%.
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Figure A1. Inflation and unemployment rate. Spain. 1966-1998.
Within this broad picture, we can distinguish …ve di¤erent macroeconomic
periods relevant to the Spanish Phillips curve.
The Period 1969-1977
From 1969 to 1974, Spain experienced a very strong expansion, with GDP growing
at an annual rate of 6.6%. 1973 was the …rst year in the postwar period when
in‡ation exceeded 10%, primarily on account of intense domestic demand pressure.
In the following years, Spain had to deal with two severe macroeconomic shocks.
One was the …rst oil price shock, which had a pronounced e¤ect on in‡ation and
unemployment since Spanish industry was heavily dependent on oil imports. The
other was the advent of unions in collective wage bargaining. Although unions
were not legalized until 1977, their de facto in‡uence was asserting itself already in
1973. The immediate implication in the period 1973-77 was a wage-price spiral, in
which unions pushed up wages su¢ciently to permit real wage growth after taking
past in‡ation into account, while …rms raised prices at an accelerating rate in order
to recover their margins. This spiral was aggravated through accommodating
macroeconomic policies. As a result, in‡ation rose above 15% during the period
1974-76 and reached 24.5% in 1977. However, the e¤ects of the above shocks on
unemployment were delayed; unemployment remained low, as shown in Figure A1
and Figure 3a.
The Period 1978-1985
This period featured the following further shocks. First, tight monetary policy was
implemented in 1978 to control in‡ation, in accordance with the Moncloa Pacts50.
50These pacts consisted of a set of policy agreements between the government, …rms and unions
in response to the economic crisis. On the one hand, there was a very restrictive monetary policy;
31
Next, the second oil price shock occurred in 1979. Together, these shocks reduced
consumption, investment, and employment. As a consequence of the Moncloa
Pacts, an incomes policy was implemented between 1978 and 1986, whereby the
government set an in‡ation target, the unions agreed to accept moderation in
wage increases, and …rms agreed to price moderation.
In 1984 the government began a …rst wave of labor market reform by intro-
ducing …xed-term contracts to increase labor market ‡exibility and stimulate job
creation. As a result temporary employment grew to one third of total employ-
ment over the second half of the 1980s.
As Figures A1 and 3a indicate, in‡ation came down during this period, but
the unemployment rate rose dramatically, as a consequence of the lagged e¤ects
of the 1973-77 shocks as well as the 1978-1985 shocks.
The Period 1986-1990
Spain joined the EEC in 1986, and the resulting need for international competi-
tiveness in what were previously highly protected product markets put downward
pressure on wages and prices. Monetary policy was relaxed in 1986 and 1987,
in view of the previous fall in in‡ation. These developments, together with the
lagged e¤ects of the labor market reforms of 1984, led to a sharp increase in em-
ployment51. GDP grew at a 4.5% annual rate, stoked by strong domestic demand.
To prevent a resurgence of high in‡ation, monetary policies were tightened in the
late 1980s, a move reinforced by Spain’s entry into the EMS in 1989.
The upshot of these developments was that the unemployment rate fell from
21.5% in 1985 to 16.3% in 1990, whereas in‡ation remained ‡at (the in‡ation rate,
measured by the GDP de‡ator, was at 7.7% in 1985 and 7.3% in 1990).
The Period 1991-2000
A rise in household indebtedness, the Iraqi war of 1991, the upward pressure
on interest rates due to German uni…cation, and the EMS crisis of 1992 and
1993 together pushed the Spanish economy into a short-lived but deep recession.
The unemployment rate rose from 15.9% in 1990 to 23.7% in 1994. This reces-
sion, together with the tight monetary policy implemented in accordance with the
Maastricht Treaty signed in 1991, led to a decline in in‡ation from 7.3% in 1990
to 4.0% in 1994.
on the other, there were various structural measures, especially tax reform, incomes policy,
and measures to promote competition, such as those in the …nancial market. The restrictive
monetary policy was implemented right away; the structural policies took several years to apply.
51Whereas temporary contracts were a rarity before 1984, the ratio of …xed-term employment
to dependent employment rose to 15.6% in 1987 (…rst year with o¢cial data), and further to
32.2% in 1991.
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In 1994 the Spanish government implemented a second wave of labor market
reform52, and the Central Bank became independent, with a mandate to focus ex-
clusively on in‡ation control. In 1997 there followed a third reform wave, in which
…ring costs on permanent contracts were reduced, thereby partially reversing the
trend towards temporary employment53.
These two labor market reforms played an important role in containing real
wage growth and this in‡uence, along with a new cyclical upturn, provided a
strong stimulus to employment in the second half of the 1990s. In years 1995-99,
the annual growth rate of GDP reached 3.5% with an annual increase of 3.3% in
employment and around 1.8 million jobs created.
These developments were reinforced by the monetary policy run-up to Spain’s
EMU entry in 1999, involving a sharp reduction in interest rates after 1995. In
an attempt to keep in‡ation under control nevertheless, the government supple-
mented its labor market reforms by opening its product markets to foreign com-
petition. Whereas this involved mainly the industrial sector in the second half
of the 1980s, in the 1990s it included the service sector, particularly the …nan-
cial, transport, communication and telecommunication sectors. Several important
public companies were privatized, which helped reduce the public-sector de…cit.
As a result, the pronounced increase in employment in the second half of the 1990s
was accompanied by a reduction in in‡ation. However, the labor force expanded
and thus Spain’s unemployment rate responded only moderately; by the end of
the 1990s, it was still above 15%.
52This second wave was a response to the …rst. The main …xed-term contract in the 1984
reform was the ‘employment promotion contract,’ which was used heavily by employers to
cover both temporary and permanent tasks, and it gave Spain the highest rate of temporary
employment in the EU. Thus, in the second wave of labor market reform of 1994, the government
tried to restrict the use of this contract by attempting substitute it for other temporary contracts
such as the ‘contract per task or service’ and the ‘contract for launching new activities’. These
were originally targeted towards some groups of hard-to-place workers, but in fact they were
used in the same way as the previous contract. As a result, the third wave of reform in 1997
was implemented to favor permanent contracts.
53The share of temporary employment on total dependent employment had reached 33.7% in
1994, remained at 33.6% in 1997, and reduced to 32.1% in 2000.
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Appendix B: OLS estimates and misspeci…cation tests
Table A1: Wage equation, OLS, 1966-1998.
Dependent variable: Wt
coe¢cient t-stat. Misspeci…cation tests¤
Cnt 4:85 (4:11) SC[Â2 (1)] 4.19[0:055]
Wt¡1 0:68 (5:79) LIN[Â2 (1)] 0.34[0:56]
W 74t¡1 ¡0:002 (¡1:73) NOR[Â2 (2)] 0.34[0:84]
W 84t¡1 ¡0:003 (¡3:57) ARCH[Â2 (1)] 0.89[0:35]
W 87t¡1 ¡0:005 (¡5:41) HET[Â2 (14)] 0.58[0:86]
W 97t¡1 ¡0:001 (¡2:19)
Wt¡2 ¡0:46 (¡4:70)
Pt 0:66 (5:83)
P 89t ¡0:009 (¡3:34)
Mt 0:16 (2:12)
ut¡1 ¡0:33 (¡2:32)
µt 0:44 (2:16)
P It 0:07 (2:50)
+ LL=111.11, AIC=-5.95, SC=-5.36
++ [F (1; 20)] = 0:30 [0:59]
* Probabilities in square brackets
X Structural stability cannot be rejected at the 5% size of the test
+ Log likelihood (LL), Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SC) criteria
++ Wald test for long-run no money illusion
34
Table A2: Price equation, OLS, 1966-1998.
Dependent variable: Pt
coe¢cient t-stat. Misspeci…cation tests¤
Cnt ¡5:56 (¡5:15) SC[Â2 (1)] 1:51 [0:23]
Pt¡1 0:78 (4:38) LIN[Â2 (1)] 1:49 [0:24]
P 79t¡1 ¡0:012 (¡2:74) NOR[Â2 (2)] 0:18 [0:91]
P 87t¡1 ¡0:006 (¡2:08) ARCH[Â2 (1)] 0:26 [0:62]
Pt¡2 ¡0:39 (¡3:94) HET[Â2 (22)] 0:60 [0:84]
Wt¡1 0:32 (3:07)
Mt 0:24 (5:29)
M88t 0:002 (2:70)
M94t 0:000 (0:98)
µt ¡0:77 (¡4:19)
P It 0:06 (2:82)
P I;77t 0:010 (3:58)
P I;86t 0:015 (4:59)
+ LL=119.04, AIC=-6.43, SC=-5.84
++ [F (1; 20)] = 2:56 [0:13]
* Probabilities in square brackets
+ Log likelihood (LL), Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SC) criteria
++ Wald test for long-run no money illusion
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Table A3: Labor force equation, OLS, 1966-1998.
Dependent variable: Lt Misspeci…cation tests¤
coe¢cient t-stat.
Cnt ¡0:54 (¡1:74) SC[Â2 (1)] 0:12 [0:74]
Lt¡1 0:84 (18:3) LIN[Â2 (1)] 1:39 [0:25]
¢Lt¡2 ¡0:34 (¡2:16) NOR[Â2 (1)] 0:46 [0:79]
wt ¡0:03 (¡2:42) ARCH[Â2 (1)] 1:74 [0:20]
¢ut ¡0:12 (¡2:04) HET[Â2 (1)] 1:42 [0:24]
Zt 0:20 (3:76)
+ LL=133.99, AIC=-7.76, SC=-7.48
++ [F (1; 27)] = 3:34 [0:08]
* Probabilities in square brackets
+ Log likelihood (LL), Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SC) criteria
++ Wald test for unit long-run elasticity of L w.r.t. Z
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Table A4: Employment equation, OLS, 1966-1998.
Dependent variable: Nt Misspeci…cation tests¤
coe¢cient t-stat.
Cnt 0:47 (0:38) SC[Â2 (1)] 1:43 [0:25]
Nt¡1 0:84 (6:93) LIN[Â2 (1)] 1:51 [0:24]
N74t¡1 ¡0:001 (¡2:31) NOR[Â2 (1)] 1:27 [0:53]
N84t¡1 ¡0:001 (¡1:28) ARCH[Â2 (1)] 0:01 [0:91]
N93t¡1 ¡0:002 (¡6:65) HET[Â2 (1)] 0:69 [0:80]
kt 0:64 (2:94)
kt¡1 ¡1:35 (¡4:33)
kt¡2 0:83 (3:64)
wt ¡0:15 (¡4:50)
µt¡1 0:34 (2:42)
µ79t¡1 0:02 (1:98)
¢Lt 0:65 (3:02)
bt ¡0:21 (¡9:16)
¿ t ¡0:34 (¡1:33)
d71 0:01 (2:22)
+ LL=141.97, AIC=-7.69, SC=-7.01
++ [F (1; 18)] = 0:35 [0:56]
* Probabilities in square brackets
+ Log likelihood (LL), Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SC) criteria
++ Wald test for constant returns to scale
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Table A5: Capital stock equation, OLS, 1966-1998.
Dependent variable: kt Misspeci…cation tests¤
coe¢cient t-statistic
Cnt ¡1:24 (¡1:76) SC[Â2 (1)] 1:13 [0:30]
kt¡1 1:34 (10:5) LIN[Â2 (1)] 0:33 [0:57]
kt¡2 ¡0:67 (¡4:66) NOR[Â2 (1)] 2:64 [0:27]
kt¡3 0:23 (3:16) ARCH[Â2 (1)] 0:75 [0:39]
Nt 0:26 (5:38) HET[Â2 (1)] 0:68 [0:78]
Nt¡1 ¡0:13 (¡1:66)
Nt¡2 0:03 (0:74)
µt 0:22 (3:40)
µt¡1 ¡0:11 (¡1:81)
mt 0:03 (1:74)
wt¡1 ¡0:02 (¡0:92)
ct¡1 ¡0:01 (¡2:19)
¿ t¡1 ¡0:30 (¡2:11)
d71 ¡0:013 (¡4:55)
+ LL=164.73, AIC=-9.13, SC=-8.50
++ [F (1; 19)] = 2:82 [0:11]
* Probabilities in square brackets
+ Log likelihood (LL), Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SC) criteria
++ Wald test for constant returns to scale
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Table A6: Production function, OLS, 1966-1998.
Dependent variable: yt Misspeci…cation tests¤
coe¢cient t-statistic
Cnt ¡1:78 (¡1:22) SC[Â2 (1)] 0.09[0:76]
yt¡1 0:36 (1:60) LIN[Â2 (1)] 1.62[0:22]
yt¡2 ¡0:27 (1:75) NOR[Â2 (1)] 0.66[0:84]
kt 0:45 (4:68) ARCH[Â2 (1)] 0.00[0:96]
k75t ¡0:001 (¡2:20) HET[Â2 (1)] 1.47[0:23]
Nt 0:58 (4:04)
N 84t 0:003 (3:32)
t 0:003 (1:23)
t78 ¡0:001 (¡2:22)
+ LL=105.25, AIC=-5.83, SC=-5.42
++ [F (1; 24)] = 1:77 [0:20]
* Probabilities in square brackets
+ Log likelihood (LL), Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SC) criteria
++ Wald test for constant returns to scale
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Figures A2: Actual and Fitted Values of the Unemployment and Inflation Rates
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Appendix C: Kernel Density Analysis for Money Growth
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Figure A3. Money supply growth Kernel density function. 1966-1998.
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First regime: 15%
Second regime: 5%
Change of
regime in 1989
40
